Risks generally lead to Protecting Behavior. However, it is still unknown which specific Protecting Behavior results from Perceived Privacy Risk in Social Network Sites (SNSs). In this article, we draw from the Protection Motivation Theory to postulate an influence of Perceived Privacy Risk (Threat Appraisal) on six Privacy Protecting Behaviors SNS members can use, which we identified in the literature: Refusal, Misrepresentation, Removal, Selectivity in Connections, Termination of Connections, and Strictness of Privacy Settings. Moreover, we argue that because of differences between the Coping Appraisals of the six identified Privacy Protecting Behaviors, the extent of the influence of Perceived Privacy Risk on these six behaviors differs. We conclude by giving an outlook on the planned empirical evaluation of our research model as well as on potential practical implications.
Introduction
Social Network Sites (SNSs) provide multiple possibilities to disclose personal information (Boyd and Ellison 2007) . As a result, using them presents risks to the privacy of their members: indeed, the members' information could be used for unwelcome commercial purposes or members could become the target of personal attacks (cf. Krasnova et al. 2010a) .
People can address their Perceived Privacy Risk by performing Privacy Protecting Behaviors (e.g., Son and Kim 2008) . Perceived Privacy Risk is the degree to which a person believes that using an SNS has negative consequences with regards to his/her privacy (cf. Chen 2013; Dinev and Hart 2006; Featherman and Pavlou 2003; Kim et al. 2008; Krasnova et al. 2010b; Peter and Ryan 1976; Wu et al. 2009 ); Privacy Protecting Behavior is the set of possibilities SNS members have at their disposal to safeguard themselves against the potential negative consequences associated with the risks to their privacy (cf. Krasnova et al. 2010b; Son and Kim 2008; Wu et al. 2009 ). But which specific Protecting Behaviors result from Perceived Privacy Risk in SNSs?
In this article, we draw from the Protection Motivation Theory to postulate an influence of Perceived Privacy Risk (Threat Appraisal) on six Privacy Protecting Behaviors SNS members can use, which we identified in the literature: Refusal, Misrepresentation, Removal, Selectivity in Connections, Termination of Connections, and Strictness of Privacy Settings (cf. Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Krasnova et al. 2010b; Son and Kim 2008) . Moreover, we argue that because of differences between the Coping Appraisals of the six identified Privacy Protecting Behaviors, the extent of the influence of Perceived Privacy Risk on these six behaviors differs.
Theoretical Background

Protection Motivation Theory
The Protection Motivation Theory (Maddux and Rogers 1983; Rogers 1975; Rogers 1983) (Figure 1 ) generally postulates that an individual's Threat Appraisal and Coping Appraisal both influence his/her Protection Motivation, which is the direct antecedent of his/her Actual Protecting Behavior ( Table 1 in the appendix defines Protection Motivation Theory's central constructs). More specifically, an individual has two possibilities to cope with a threat he/she is facing: (1) do nothing or (2) take counteractions. Whereas Threat Appraisal evaluates the threat itself, i.e., both the positive and negative consequences that might occur if an individual chooses to do nothing about it, Coping Appraisal evaluates the possible Protecting Behaviors that might safeguard against the threat. Indeed, Coping Appraisal is a calculus of Response Efficacy, Self-efficacy, and Response Costs (as defined in Table 2 in the appendix). Whereas Response Efficacy and Self-Efficacy increase Coping Appraisal, the Response Costs decrease it (Floyd et al. 2000) .
Multiple studies have successfully used the Protection Motivation Theory to explain people's Protecting Behavior in different contexts. For example, this theory has been used to explain people's behavior when addressing health threats. For an overview, see Floyd et al. (2000) .
In the following section, we describe the six Privacy Protecting Behaviors that can be used by SNS members to cope with their Perceived Privacy Risk, a specific manifestation of Threat Appraisal.
Figure 1. Protection Motivation Theory
Privacy Protecting Behavior
SNSs provide multiple possibilities to disclose personal information (Boyd and Ellison 2007) . This ubiquitous provision of personal information bears risks, that is, "the extent to which there is an uncertainty in significant and disappointing outcomes that may be realized" (Chen , p. 1222 Sitkin and Pablo 1992) , with regards to the privacy of the members, i.e., their "claim … to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" (Westin 1968, p. 7) .
It is known that SNS members can choose to perform Privacy Protecting Behaviors in order to protect themselves against their Perceived Privacy Risk. Based on a literature study, we identified three kinds of studies that deal with Privacy Protecting Behaviors ( Table 3 in the appendix gives an overview of all the (implicitly) examined Privacy Protecting Behaviors):
One research-in-progress study crafted a catalogue of behaviors that people might use to safeguard their privacy . Furthermore, some studies examined the privacy-related antecedents of Privacy Protecting Behavior in general. These studies did not differentiate between different kinds of protecting behavior at the construct level, rather they differentiated between different kinds of protecting behavior at the item level Wu et al. 2009 ). For example, Chen et al. (2009) found a positive influence of Privacy Concerns on Information Privacy Protective Responses in SNSs. Their dependent construct was measured using a four-item scale with each item representing one specific kind of protective response such as Complaining Directly to Online Companies. Finally, some studies examined the privacy-related antecedents of specific Privacy Protecting Behaviors. These studies differentiated between different kinds of behavior at the construct level Ernst 2014; Krasnova et al. 2009; Krasnova et al. 2010b; Lankton and Tripp 2013; Son and Kim 2008; Stutzman and Kramer-Duffield 2010; Thambusamy et al. 2010) . For example, found that Privacy Concerns negatively influence the amount of Self-Disclosure.
Whereas Quitting the SNS Platform or limiting Actual System Use are two possibilities SNS members can use to safeguard their privacy (cf. Table 3 in the appendix), in doing so, they simultaneously limit or prevent themselves from accessing the SNSs' beneficial services. Complaining to SNS Service Provider or Other Parties, Complaining Directly to Online Companies, Complaining Indirectly to Third-Party Organizations, Negative Word-of-Mouth, and Searching for Additional Protection Tools only promise SNS members indirect possibilities of safeguarding themselves against Privacy Risks. Managing Personally Identifiable Information Diligently is a rather general behavior that can include multiple different specific behaviors. Overall, we do not consider any of these behaviors in the following study. Rather, we focus on the remaining behaviors found in the literature that promise members immediate chances for success at safeguarding their privacy without simultaneously limiting or preventing their access to the SNSs' beneficial services.
These behaviors can be summarized by six Privacy Protecting Behaviors, which we define in Table 4 Table 5 in the appendix gives an overview of this classification.
Research Model
In this section, we draw from the Protection Motivation Theory to build our research model. More specifically, we use the Protection Motivation Theory's upper causal chain (Threat AppraisalàProtection MotivationàActual Protecting Behavior) to postulate an influence of Perceived Privacy Risk (Threat Appraisal) on each of the six Privacy Protecting Behaviors (Actual Protecting Behavior) identified earlier. Furthermore, we use Protection Motivation Theory's lower causal chain (Coping AppraisalàProtection MotivationàActual Protecting Behavior) to build hypotheses concerning the extent of Perceived Privacy Risk's influences on these behaviors. Figure 2 
presents our research model. 1
Perceived Privacy Risk is a privacy-specific manifestation of Threat Appraisal. Indeed, it describes the SNS members' evaluation of the negative consequences to their privacy 2 that might occur if they choose maladaptive behavior, i.e., do not protect themselves within SNSs' networks (cf. Floyd et al. 2000) . 1 In contrast to the original Protection Motivation Theory, we conceptualized a direct relationship between Threat Appraisal and the Actual Protecting Behaviors. This is in line with multiple studies from different contexts that do not examine the intentions to perform a specific behavior, but rather the behavior itself (cf. Yousafzai et al. 2007 ). 2 The misuse of personal information as well as the loss of control of personal information are regularly seen as the two most severe negative consequences with regards to an individual's privacy (e.g., Featherman and Pavlou 2003; Wu et al. 2009 ). Misuse of personal information includes any unwelcome use of an individual's personal information: this includes using the information for commercial purposes, becoming the target of personal attacks (for example, bullying), data being misinterpreted, and/or becoming an unknowing participant in illegal activities (for example, identity theft) (cf. Krasnova et al. 2010a) . Loss of control of personal information depicts any loss of control regarding how, when, or to
Figure 2. Research Model
Each of the six Privacy Protecting Behaviors identified earlier generally enables SNS members to safeguard themselves against potential negative consequences associated with the risks to their privacy: First, by refusing to provide specific personal information, falsifying personal information, and/or removing previously disclosed personal information (cf. Son and Kim 2008) , SNS members protect their privacy by controlling the actual information that is accessible by others. Indeed, SNS members cannot lose control of missing/false personal information. Likewise, information that is protected in this manner cannot be misused by others (cf. Dinev and Hart 2006; Wu et al. 2009 ). Furthermore, by being selective when accepting or requesting connections in SNSs (cf. Bulgurcu et al. 2010) , terminating specific connections (cf. Bulgurcu et al. 2010) , and/or using privacy settings with strict information access control (cf. Krasnova et al. 2010b) , SNS members are able to protect their privacy by controlling the entities that have access to their personal information. Indeed, allowing profile access only to connected entities and limiting these to trustworthy ones decreases the likelihood of losing control of personal information and decreases the likelihood that the personal information be misused (cf. Dinev and Hart 2006; Wu et al. 2009 ).
Drawing from the Protection Motivation Theory's upper causal chain, which postulates that Threat Appraisal (indirectly) influences an individual's Actual Protecting Behavior, we hypothesize that:
There is a positive influence of Perceived Privacy Risk on Refusal (H1), Misrepresentation (H2), Removal (H3), Selectivity in Connections (H4), Termination of Connections (H5), and Strictness of Privacy Settings (H6).
Furthermore, according to the Protection Motivation Theory, not only does the Perceived Privacy Risk, i.e. Threat Appraisal, influence an individual's actual behavior; so does the evaluation of the potential protecting behaviors themselves, i.e., Coping Appraisal. In other words, in order to respond to a Perceived Privacy Risk, SNS members prefer to use Privacy Protecting Behaviors that they consider as superior to the alternatives. In the following paragraphs, we discuss which of the six Privacy Protecting Behaviors might have better Coping Appraisals than their direct alternatives. We then use this information to build hypotheses regarding the extent of Perceived Privacy Risk's influence on them.
Disclosing incorrect personal information or refusing to give information within SNSs' networks both equally protect members against privacy risks. Indeed, no one can misuse missing or incorrect information. Likewise, an SNS member cannot lose control over information that is protected with Misrepresentation or Refusal. Hence, SNS members can be expected to consider the Response Efficacy of Misrepresentation and Refusal to be more or less equal. However, the Misrepresentation of information is more challenging than Refusal. Indeed, in order to give misrepresented information, SNS members have to first invent this information. In contrast, in order to perform Refusal, members literally do nothing at all. Hence, an individual's Self-efficacy regarding Misrepresentation can be expected to be lower than an individual's Self-efficacy regarding Refusal. Moreover, there are specific negative side effects, i.e. Response Costs, which also differentiate Misrepresentation from Refusal. For example, SNS what extent, someone [for example, employers, teachers, parents, unknown persons (Krasnova et al. 2010a) ] might see/use personal information (cf. Westin 1968) .
contacts might take falsified information as truth, thus, getting a false impression of the corresponding SNS member. Also, members using a fake name in an SNS network might not be found by their real-life contacts. Hence, whereas Misrepresentation and Refusal can be expected to have equal Response Efficacies, Misrepresentation has a lower Self-efficacy and higher Response Costs.
Furthermore, Removing personal information from SNSs and refusing to give this information in the first place lead to the same negative results that might arise from missing information. Likewise, both Removal and Refusal are comparably challenging to perform. However, whereas refusing to give personal information ensures that no one can access the corresponding information in an SNS (because it is not present, and was never present), removing previously disclosed information does not provide the same extent of protection. Indeed, anyone might have seen the information when it was present. Hence, SNS members using Removal to protect their privacy can neither be sure that they have control over the previously disclosed information, nor that someone might not misuse it sometime in the future. Hence, whereas Removal and Refusal can be expected to have equal Self-efficacies and Response Costs, Removal has a lower Response Efficacy.
Finally, terminating existing connections in SNSs or being selective when accepting them in the first place lead to the same negative results that might arise due from not having certain connections. Also, both behaviors are comparably challenging to perform. However, whereas Selectivity in Connections ensures that specific entities do not have access to personal information in SNSs, terminating existing connections does not provide the same extent of protection. Indeed, a former contact might have seen the personal information when the connection existed. Hence, like Removal, Termination of Connections can neither ensure SNS members that they have control over their personal information, nor that someone might not misuse it sometime in the future. Hence, whereas Termination of Connections and Selectivity in Connections can be expected to have equal Self-efficacies and Response Costs, Termination of Connections has a lower Response Efficacy.
In summary, there are differences between Refusal, Misrepresentation, Removal, Selectivity in Connections, and Termination of Connections regarding the Self-efficacies, Response Efficacies and/or Response Costs of these behaviors. More specifically, regarding the Privacy Protecting Behaviors that control the accessible information, Misrepresentation has a lower Self-efficacy and higher Response Costs than Refusal; and Removal has a lower Response Efficacy than Refusal. Furthermore, regarding the Privacy Protecting Behaviors that control entities that have access to personal information, Termination of Connections has a lower Response Efficacy than Selectivity in Connections.
As postulated by the Protection Motivation Theory, these differences lead to differing Coping Appraisals. More specifically, Misrepresentation and Refusal are expected to have equal Response Efficacies but Misrepresentation has lower Self-efficacies as well as higher Response Costs. Since Self-efficacy increases Coping Appraisal and Response Costs decrease it (Floyd et al. 2000) , Misrepresentation can consistently be expected to have a lower Coping Appraisal than Refusal. In a similar manner, the Coping Appraisal of Removal can be expected to be lower than of Refusal and the Coping Appraisal of Termination of Connections can be expected to be lower than of Selectivity in Connections.
Overall, SNS members can choose between different potential Privacy Protecting Behaviors to respond to their Perceived Privacy Risk. However, there are differences with regards to the Response Efficacies, Selfefficacies and Response Costs of these potential behaviors. As a result, SNS members consider some potential behaviors to be better (i.e., more effective, less challenging, and/or less costly) than others. According to the Protection Motivation Theory, SNS members prefer to use Privacy Protecting Behaviors that they consider superior to the alternatives, in order to respond to their Perceived Privacy Risk. Hence, it can be expected that Perceived Privacy Risk leads rather to Refusal than to Misrepresentation or Removal. Likewise, it will rather lead to Selectivity in Connections than to Termination of Connections. We hypothesize that:
The influence of Perceived Privacy Risk on Refusal is higher than its influence on Misrepresentation (H7) or Removal (H8).
The influence of Perceived Privacy Risk on Selectivity in Connections is higher than its influence on Termination of Connections (H9).
Outlook
We drew from the Protection Motivation Theory (Maddux and Rogers 1983; Rogers 1975; Rogers 1983) in order to postulate influences of Perceived Privacy Risk on six Privacy Protecting Behaviors identified in the literature, and to build hypotheses concerning the extent of these influences.
To empirically evaluate our research model, we plan to survey users of Facebook using a quantitative questionnaire. In order to accomplish this, we plan to adapt existing measurements of Perceived Privacy Risk to our context and, due to a lack of suitable operationalization, to develop our own operationalization for the six potential Privacy Protecting Behaviors. To collect the data, we plan to use Facebook advertisements in multiple regions around the world that will promise a raffle of gift certificates from Amazon.com for every completed questionnaire. Finally, we plan to analyze the gathered data using a structural equation modeling approach.
Our findings can be expected to hold important practical implications. Foremost, if confirmed, our hypotheses would suggest that SNS service providers need to actively manage people's privacy risk perception since SNS members' resulting Refusal, Misrepresentation, Removal, Selectivity in Connections, Termination of Connections, and Strictness of Privacy Settings hinder their business model, i.e., the selling of personal advertisements.
Privacy Protecting Behavior Definition
Refusal
The extent to which a member intentionally refuses to provide specific information on SNSs
Misrepresentation
The extent to which a member intentionally provides dishonest or inaccurate information on SNSs (cf. Krasnova et al. 2010b )
Removal
The extent to which a member intentionally removes specific information from SNSs
Selectivity in Connections
The extent of a member's selectiveness when forming connections in SNSs, e.g., SNS-friendships, connections with company/product pages, connections with applications (e.g., Facebook games), connections with third-party websites
Termination of Connections
The extent to which a member intentionally terminates specific connections on SNSs, e.g., SNSfriendships, connections with company/product pages, connections with applications (e.g., Facebook games), connections with third-party websites
Strictness of Privacy Settings
The extent to which a member has strict privacy settings in SNSs 
